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Abstract 
 
There is a substantial literature examining coordination in public goods games. We 
conducted an experiment to explore how varying patterns of thresholds affect the 
willingness of subjects to contribute to a public good. We had subjects play a multi-
period game where each subject was allocated an initial point endowment, told a 
threshold for the group and had to choose how much to contribute to the common pot. 
Each period is identical, except for the possibility of having a different threshold, 
which is always stated before the players make their contributions. We found that 
while contributions are similar for the increasing and decreasing threshold group types 
when thresholds were low, a sizeable gap opens up around the average threshold size. 
We found that for nearly every threshold, it is more profitable to be in an increasing 
than in a decreasing threshold group type. Early cooperation seems to facilitate the 
achievement of harder-to-reach thresholds, which require considerable contributions 
from all members of the group. These findings are also very robust in the regression 
specifications. Our findings shed light on the role of past cooperative success and 
threshold patterns on subsequent willingness to cooperate. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Much research has been done on how to facilitate coordination in public goods games (Fedyard, 1995).  
In particular, sanctioning institutions and reputation mechanisms have both been found to assist in the 
facilitation of coordination by discouraging free-riding (Olson 1965; Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr and 
Gächter, 2000; Masclet et al., 2003; Egas and Riedl, 2005; Gächter and Herrmann, 2006; Bochet et al., 
2006; and Carpenter, 2006).   
 
Building on this literature, we study how varying thresholds affect the willingness of subjects 
to contribute to a public good.  Since many public goods are lumpy (parks, roads, bridges, etc), an “all 
or nothing” contributions process, such as a public good threshold mechanism (or provision point 
mechanism) is appropriate. In a threshold point public good mechanism, members of the group 
impacted by the project submit bids stating their dollar commitment to covering the project costs. If the 
sum of contributions do not cover the threshold (equivalent to a predetermined cost of the project), the 
project is not undertaken. If the sum of the contributions covers the pre-established threshold, then the 
project is provided. We play a standard public goods game with repeated interactions and varying 
group thresholds below which the players receive no return on their contributions. We introduce three 
treatment threshold group types, the first of which has an increasing, the second a decreasing and the 
last a constant threshold. This within-subjects design allows us to analyze the relation between patterns 
of variation of the required contributions (i.e. increasing, decreasing) and actual contributions, thereby 
shedding light on the role of past cooperative success and failure on subsequent willingness to 
cooperate.  
 
Perhaps more than any other topic in experimental economics, public goods games directly 
relate to real world coordination scenarios. From taxes to charitable contributions, we are frequently 
asked to contribute to public goods.  But coordination failures can prevent the provision of valuable 
goods, particularly when contribution is voluntary and there is a large incentive to free-ride.  A better 
understanding of people’s willingness to contribute to public goods can shed light on many economic 
problems, from tax evasion in public economics to village savings schemes in developing countries. 
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One example very close to our experimental design is Niagara Mohawk’s Green Choice 
Program, a provision point public good mechanism to provide an environmentally friendly power 
station.  Participants in the program commit to paying a fixed surcharge in addition to their electric. If 
enough participants participate, the power station will be built, otherwise all investments are lost and 
the station is not built.4
 
In the relatively short history of experimental economics, nearly 200 public goods experiments 
have been conducted thus far5. The main finding is that significant contributions are observed despite 
the individual incentives to free ride. Economists have designed experiments with a variety of 
treatments to better understand motives for contributing. Altruism provides one possible explanation, 
since contributions may be rational if enough utility is derived from helping others. Many studies have 
shown that an increase in the marginal per capita return raises contributions, but the interpretation of 
this result is complicated by the fact that the marginal per capita returns affects both one’s private 
return (the “internal return”) and the benefit to others (the “external return”). Goeree, Holt and Laury 
(2002) report that contributions are positively related to the external return, holding the internal return 
constant. Not surprisingly, contributions are also positively related to the internal return.  
 
The addition of multiple rounds adds important dimensions to the public goods game. In a 
multiple round experiment some people might reciprocate by contributing more in response to 
cooperative actions of others. Such reciprocity also opens up the possibility for strategic behavior, 
where a person might contribute more in early rounds to encourage others to do the same. This 
explanation is consistent with the observation that contributions decline with repetition. Contributions 
are also somewhat lower for people who have participated in a public goods experiment on a previous 
date. Despite the negative effect of repetition and experience on contribution rates, some people 
contribute in all rounds.  Thresholds add a further dimension by providing a minimum contribution 
level for receipt of the public good.  These can serve as a reference point for contributions, but may 
also discourage contributions by providing for the possibility of a zero return on investment if other 
group members do not contribute sufficiently. 
                                                 
4 Schulze, William (1995). “GREEN PRICING: Solutions to the Potential Free-Rider Problem.” Discussion Paper, 
Department of Economics, University of Colorado. 
5 Holt, Charles, The Y2K Bibliography of Experimental Economics and Social Science 
http://www.people.virginia.edu/~cah2k/y2k.htm 
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 To date, there exist no empirical tests of how coordination varies with threshold levels in 
multiple-round experiments. We study this issue with a simple experiment where subjects play a multi-
period public good contribution game.  Subjects are randomly assigned to groups for a fixed number of 
periods.  In every period, each player is allocated an initial point endowment and told a threshold for 
the group.  They he chooses how much to contribute to the common pot.  If group contributions sum to 
a number greater than the threshold for the period, then the total contribution is increased and 
distributed evenly among the group members.  If the group fails to meet the threshold, then each player 
receives only the points that he did not contribute to the pot.  Each period is identical, except for the 
possibility of having a different threshold, which is always stated before the players make their 
contributions.   
  
We hypothesize that subjects contribute in a given period based not only on the threshold but 
also on their history of cooperation or cooperation failure with their assigned group.  While standard 
game theory predicts that equilibrium should be zero contribution no matter the threshold patterns 
(Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1984; Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989), at least two possible countervailing 
behavioral patterns can arise from the presence of variable thresholds.  In the first, difficulty of 
coordination is increasing in the size of the threshold.  In other words, lower thresholds facilitate 
coordination, possibly through the knowledge that the threshold can be reached even in the presence of 
some free-riding.  Alternately, difficulty of coordination could be decreasing in the size of the 
threshold.  With low thresholds, it is possible for subjects to assume the fulfillment of the threshold 
even if they fail to contribute, exacerbating the free-rider problem.  
 
We hypothesize that the former effect dominates.  Under this hypothesis, lower thresholds will 
be achieved more frequently.  More importantly, we posit that early coordination will lead to greater 
coordination even as the thresholds become large.  Although it is impossible to know the exact 
motivation of such behavior, we suggest that the formation of trust and team spirit encourage greater 
willingness to contribute conditional on past success.  This is really just a reformulation of conditional 
cooperation.  Our experiment aims to demonstrate how changes in the pattern of thresholds can have 
significant effects on the variable upon which players are conditioning their cooperation, namely past 
cooperation, leading to significant differences in both contributions and outcomes. 
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 Our results appear consistent with this hypothesis. We find that for nearly every threshold, it is 
more profitable to be in an increasing than in a decreasing threshold group type. Contributions are 
similar for the increasing and decreasing threshold group types when thresholds were low, a sizeable 
gap opens up around the average threshold size. We find that successful cooperation of the early stages 
in the increasing group produces higher contributions than the failed cooperation of the early stages of 
the decreasing threshold group type. From 50 to 70, the increasing threshold group types are much 
more likely to attain the public good than their decreasing threshold group type counterparts.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  In Section 2, we detail the experimental design.  In 
Section 3, we present the graphs, tables and regressions, as well as explanations of the major results. 
Section 4 closes with a summary of our main results and concludes.  Appendix A provides a walk-
through of the experiment as experienced by the subjects.  Appendix B contains the survey used to 
gather personal data on the subjects. 
 
II. Experimental design 
 
Our experimental design is a variation on the standard multi-period public goods game.  Subjects are 
randomly assigned to groups of 4 for each stage6.  A stage consists of 10 periods.  In a period, players 
are given 25 points and asked to make a contribution to their group’s public good.  Each group in each 
period has a threshold, which is the minimum total amount of contributions that the group must make 
in order to receive the public good.  If contributions fall short of the threshold, each player exits the 
round with only the money that he/she did not contribute.  If the threshold is reached, each player 
receives an additional 1.6 times the average contribution on top of the points that they did not 
contribute.  All earnings are deposited in the individual’s total profit account and cannot be used to 
make contributions in future periods; in other words, players can only make contributions from the 25 
points that they are allocated for a given period. 
 
                                                 
6 Croson and Marks (2000) show in a meta-analysis study of public goods games that the most frequently used group sizes 
are 5, 7 and 4 subjects per group.  In their own studies, Croson and Marks (1998) and Croson and Marks (1999), groups 
consist of 4 players. 
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Subjects play three stages for a total of 30 periods.  Although the order is different for different 
subjects, everyone plays one stage with increasing thresholds (from 10 to 100), one stage with 
decreasing thresholds (from 100 to 10) and one stage of constant thresholds (55 for every period).   
 
At the end of the game, the total earnings of the subjects consist of the sum of two parts: the 
attendance pay of $5 and the reward from the game, which is the total number of points they accrue 
divided by the exchange rate.  We set the exchange rate at 60 points/dollar, for expected earnings of 
approximately $20. 
 
The information structure is such that a player always knows the rules of the game he is 
playing, but is not fully aware of how much money he is making.  At the start of each stage, a player 
learns how the thresholds will be varying for those 10 periods.  He is also reminded of these thresholds 
as they make their contribution at each period.  At the end of each period, a player learns whether or 
not the group contributed enough to reach the threshold, but not the exact amount of points 
accumulated from that period.  The reason for this was to reduce any possible salience of income 
effect, where player’s total accumulations could affect his future play.  At the end of each stage, each 
player is told how many points he has accumulated to date and that he is joining a new group7. 
 
At the end of the third stage, which marked the completion of the game, subjects were asked to 
complete a brief survey.  The survey asked for information on age, gender, income, ethnicity, 
nationality and subject of study (if student), in addition to eliciting risk preferences over lotteries8.  
 
III. Results 
 
In this section we present our findings in table, graphic and regression format.  We analyze the effect 
that stages and thresholds have on the following three outcome variables: i) average contributions, ii) 
proportion of groups reaching the threshold, and iii) average profits.   
 
                                                 
7 See Appendix A for the zTree screenshots 
8 See Appendix B for the complete surveys 
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The findings are clear: in general, the increasing threshold game produces more contributions 
and higher profits than the decreasing threshold game.  This is particularly true when we look at two 
cases for which our hypothesis predicts the largest differences: in the middle range of thresholds 
(where cooperation has been established in the increasing group and disestablished in the decreasing 
group) and in the first stage (when subjects’ behavior is not confounded by having played the other 
games). 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Subjects’ Survey Information 
 
Table 1 contains basic summary characteristics of the subject pool, which appears very diverse.  
Subjects were divided almost evenly between American citizens and foreign nationals, as well as 
between men and women.  The majority were Caucasian, with the remainder mostly either African-
Americans or Asians. 
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 Table 2: Summary Statistics of Performance in the Public Good Game 
 
 
Table 2 contains the summary statistics of the major outcome variables: contribution 
(individual contribution per period), sum (total group contribution per period), reached (whether the 
threshold is reached by the group per period) and profit (individual profit earned per period).  The 
comparison to focus on is the one between increasing threshold and decreasing threshold.  Although 
average contribution and average sum are very similar for the two treatments, subjects in the increasing 
threshold group type were 16% more likely to reach the threshold than those in the decreasing 
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threshold group type.  Accordingly, profits were 12% higher in the increasing threshold group type.  In 
the figures below, we break out these summary statistics into performance by period to gain a clearer 
understanding of the different effects of the increasing and decreasing threshold group types on 
behavior and outcomes. 
 
A. Average Contribution 
Figure 1: Average Individual Contribution by Threshold Type and Threshold     
 
Note: the period corresponding to the threshold is given by the number to the right of the data point. 
 
This figure summarizes our most basic result: While contributions are similar for the increasing 
and decreasing threshold group types when thresholds were low, a sizeable gap opens up around the 
average threshold.  This is entirely consistent with our hypothesis: the successful cooperation of the 
early stages in the increasing group produces higher contributions than the failed cooperation of the 
early stages of the decreasing threshold group type.  Notice that average contributions for the 
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increasing threshold group type were higher at thresholds of 50 and 60 than the average contribution in 
the constant 55 threshold group type, while contributions at 50 and 60 for the decreasing threshold 
group type were actually lower than in the constant threshold group type.  The higher willingness to 
contribute in the increasing threshold group type persists through the threshold of 80, though the 
difference shrinks considerably. 
 
The outlier at the top right-hand corner can be explained by a lack of learning: in the first 
period of the decreasing threshold group type, many players contribute too much on the hope that the 
others will as well.  Once they observe that the threshold was not met, average contributions fall close 
to the level of contributions from the increasing threshold type for a threshold of 90, which is very low. 
 
B. Proportion of Groups Reaching the Threshold 
Figure 2: Proportions of Reaching Thresholds by Threshold Type and Threshold 
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Figure 2 demonstrates a very similar pattern to the one in Figure 1, although with less noise.  
There is little difference in the probability of reaching the threshold for the increasing and decreasing 
threshold group types at the highest and lowest thresholds.  However in the middle range, from 50 to 
70, the increasing threshold group types are much more likely to attain the public good than their 
decreasing threshold group type counterparts.  In fact, they are higher than the average of the groups 
with the constant threshold type of 55, despite the fact that the groups with the constant threshold have 
10 periods to learn how to coordinate their behavior with a threshold of 55.  This again supports our 
premise: early cooperation seems to facilitate the achievement of harder-to-reach thresholds, which 
require considerable contributions from all members of the group.  The most striking difference is at 
60: increasing threshold group types achieved the good nearly 60% of the time, while decreasing 
threshold group types managed to reach the threshold only 10% of the time. 
 
C. Average Profit 
Figure 3: Average Individual Profit by Threshold Type and Threshold 
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Figure 3 makes clear that the gap between increasing and decreasing threshold group types 
holds for profits in addition to contributions and reaching the threshold.  Ignoring the difference when 
the threshold is 100 (which is due to increasing players not having learned that others will not 
contribute sufficiently), the difference is once again most noteworthy at thresholds of 50 and 60.  
Interestingly, average profits for the increasing group remain almost constant through period 6 at 
which they had a high likelihood of reaching the threshold, but after that players begin to throw away 
money.  The increase in periods 9 and 10 for the increasing threshold group type are due to players’ 
learning that the thresholds are unreachable, and thus conserving their points instead of contributing 
them. 
 
Ultimately, this is the information of most importance.  Figure 3 demonstrates that for nearly 
ever threshold, it is more profitable to be in an increasing than in a decreasing threshold group type.  
 
Figure 4: Average Individual Profit by Threshold Type within Stage 
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 Figure 4 illustrates how average profits are affected by group, holding stage constant.  As we 
can see, the difference in profitability of the increasing and decreasing threshold group types is 
constant and large in the first stage.  This difference remains, though it becomes much smaller, in 
Stage 2, and in Stage 3 the difference is small and negative.  This is probably due to the learning 
process: half of the subjects playing increasing in the second stage played decreasing previously.  
Likewise, half of those playing decreasing in the second stage played increasing in Stage 1.  This 
shrinking gap is consistent with the idea that playing the decreasing threshold game type erodes trust, 
while playing increasing builds it.  Most interesting here is that this effect on trust seems to occur not 
only within a stage (when the group is fixed) as we had predicted, but remains even after groups are 
reassigned.  See Table 5 and the following discussion for more evidence on this inter-stage effect. 
 
Figure 5: Average Profit in the First Stage by Threshold Type and Threshold 
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Because of the unexpected “inter-stage effect,” Figure 5 displays the average profits from only 
the first period.  In this period, players have not yet learned any behavior from their previous stages.  
The results are striking: for every threshold level, players earned more points in the increasing 
threshold group type than in the decreasing threshold group type, thus supporting our initial 
hypothesis.  But this graph also reveals that most of the action seems to be in the decreasing threshold 
game.  Profits in the increasing threshold group type game at thresholds of 50 and 60 are identical to 
the constant game, suggesting that at least by those periods, little trust has been gained or lost as 
compared to a constant game.  However, the decreasing threshold groups game’s profits are 
considerably lower at those levels, suggesting a greater coordination failure than in the other two 
games.  These findings call for a more in-depth study to determine whether the dominance of 
increasing over decreasing thresholds holds up with a larger sample size. 
 
Figure 6: Average Profit by Stage within Threshold Type 
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 Figure 6 captures the same information as in Figure 4, but arranged to cluster type of game 
rather than stage.  Here, we can observe a clear downward trend in the profitability of the increasing 
threshold group type over time.  While it is possible to attribute this to the effect of time, we instead 
suggest that the subjects’ experiences in previous games are affecting their willingness to contribute.  
This story fits the course of the experiment.  If, as Figure 5 suggested, playing the decreasing threshold 
group type game erodes trust and willingness to contribute, then we would expect profits to go down in 
the increasing threshold group type game as more of its players had previously played decreasing.  In 
the first stage, none of the increasing threshold group type players had played decreasing, in the second 
stage half of them had, and in the third all had previously played the decreasing threshold type.  This is 
confounded somewhat by the experience in the constant threshold game, where profits fall and then 
rise, but we consider the constant threshold game to be distinct enough from the other two to not be 
particularly instructive. 
 
D. Regression Results  
 
In the next tables we present our regression results concerning the primary variables of interest: 
average contribution, likelihood of reaching the threshold, and profits earned (all per period). Before 
discussing these results, it is necessary to describe our empirical strategy. In all the tables, we restrict 
our sample to subjects playing with increasing or decreasing thresholds; in other words, we drop 
observations belonging to the constant threshold group type and compare only the two varying 
threshold group types. We run our baseline specification with all three stages. However, one concern is 
that when people play in the second and third stage, their behavior is affected by their experiment 
history as well as by their current assignment. Therefore, we choose to run further regressions only 
including observations from the first stage, based on the data summarized by Figure 5 above. 
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 Table 3: Individual Contribution vs. Threshold Group Type 
 
 
Table 3 presents our main results concerning the amount that people choose to contribute to the 
common pool. Our baseline specification (Column 1) includes survey controls and threshold level 
controls9. We find an effect indistinguishable from zero of the threshold group type on contribution, 
consistent with the results presented in Table 2. Note that this takes into account controlling for 
specific threshold effects. Results are very similar in Column 2 where we cluster standard errors at 
group level. Columns 3 and 4 add interactions between threshold group type and threshold level 
dummies. We find that the increasing threshold group type dummy has a large positive coefficient for 
medium thresholds. Note again that these are indeed the mid-level thresholds where we expect 
previous history to make a difference in the choice of how much to contribute. However, the results are 
                                                 
9 We choose not to report the results for the baseline survey variables coefficients in the current version (demographics, risk 
aversion). However, we plan to analyze them in future versions of the paper. 
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generally insignificant, with the exception of threshold at 60 in column 4 (significant at 10%). In 
column 5 and 6 we restrict our attention to stage one observations only, so to isolate the effect of the 
threshold group type from a potentially confounding effect of previous stage outcomes and learning. 
While keeping in mind that we are now working with a smaller sample (240 people) we now find that 
the effect of playing in a group with increasing threshold is positive overall. Moreover, when we 
include interactions with threshold levels we find that the effect is positive for every level below eighty 
and significant at 6010. However, the results are indeed robust when we use normal linear model and 
we find the coefficient in column 5 become significant (results not reported). The standout coefficient 
is Increasing*Threshold 100, which is large and negative.  As in the discussion following Figure 1, we 
attribute this to the pre-learning play of the subjects in the decreasing group, who have not yet learned 
that large contributions for a large threshold are a bad investment because there is usually someone in 
the group who is free-riding at such a high threshold.  This explains the weakly negative coefficients 
for Thresholds 80 and 90 in Table 3.  Another possible explanation is conditional cooperation: the first 
period is very important to one’s strategy. 
  
Table 4 (next page) presents our results about the likelihood of reaching the required threshold. 
Since this is a group-level variable, we collapse our dataset to group means. As the dependent variable 
is a binary indicator, we choose to use a linear probability model. All the results reported below are 
robust when we use a nonlinear probit model. Throughout the specifications presented in column 1-4 
we find that the effect of being in the increasing threshold group type is always positive (except at 
threshold 30 where the effect is negative but very small and insignificant). When we restrict our 
analysis to samples of stage one, we find an overall significant effect: subjects in the increasing 
threshold group type are .26 percentage points more likely to reach the threshold, which is an increase 
of more than 50% in the probability relative to the decreasing average presented in table 2. Finally, we 
note that the probability of reaching the threshold when playing in the increasing threshold group type 
is higher even for high thresholds. This is consistent with our explanation that subjects in the 
decreasing threshold group type are wasting their money: they face high thresholds in initial period, 
make somewhat higher contributions but still do not reach the required level. In other words, players in 
the increasing group are playing “smarter”. 
                                                 
10 Notice that, by introducing clustering, we are using asymptotic properties of the OLS model even if we have relatively 
few observations. 
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 Table 4: Probability of Reaching Threshold vs. Group Type 
 
 
Table 5 (next page) shows our results concerning profits.  As we could expect from our 
previous analysis, players in the increasing group make higher profit. The effect presented in column 
one is substantial. An increase of 2.8 profit points per period is more than 10% relative to the average. 
However, this result is no longer significant when we cluster standard errors at group level. In columns 
3-4 we introduce threshold-group type interactions and we find that the effects are strongly significant 
at level 60 and 100. Based on previous discussions, these two cases seem to show somewhat different 
stories. At 100, players in the decreasing group, on average, are contributing more money (some 
people may contribute 0, other may contribute a total 25, but the average is higher) but not enough to 
reach the threshold. At 60, players in the decreasing threshold group type are playing more 
conservatively (i.e. lower contribution) and are less likely to make the threshold. On the contrary, 
players in the increasing threshold group type benefit from previous cooperation success history, are 
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willing to contribute more, and reach the target. When looking only at stage one (column 5-6), our 
results are even stronger. The average positive effect is three times as big as the one reported in 
column one and is highly significant even after clustering. Finally, column 6 shows strong positive 
effects for almost each threshold level though most coefficient are not significant, also due to smaller 
sample size. 
 
Table 5: Profit vs. Group Type 
 
 
In Table 6 we present an interesting and unexpected finding.  Based on our observations from 
Figures 4 and 6, we noticed that previous assignment to threshold group type seemed to have an effect 
on subsequent behavior in the game.  In order to test this hypothesis, we restricted our sample to 
subjects playing the constant threshold group type game in stage 2.  Based on our experimental design, 
half of these players had faced decreasing thresholds in stage 1, while the other half had faced 
increasing thresholds in stage 1.  This provided us with a randomly assigned treatment from stage 1 
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whose effect we could test on stage 2 behavior and outcomes; in other words, our stage 1 group 
assignment can be thought of as an instrument for successful cooperation history (given what we know 
of stage 1 outcomes based on our previous analysis).  The table below shows that in fact subjects 
contribute significantly more when their previous assignment had been to an increasing threshold 
group type.  It is important to keep in mind that the stage 2 group assignment is a new randomization, 
and players know that they are playing in a new group.  Thus, this finding is indicative of a new effect, 
namely an inter-stage effect of having played increasing thresholds, rather than an intra-stage effect 
that lasts only as long as the group remains constant.  We ran this regression using data from both the 
first three periods and from all ten periods, as shown below.  We find that the effect of having played 
increasing thresholds is large and significant for the first three periods (representing a roughly 50% 
increase over the mean contribution in the constant threshold stage).  However, this effect gradually 
disappears over the course of the ten periods, suggesting a learning process where the behavior of the 
two types converges as they observe the play of their fellow group members.  The story is slightly 
different for profits.  At first, the higher contributions of the “lagged increasing” types, combined with 
a low probability of reaching the threshold, produces profit levels far lower than the “lagged 
decreasing” types.  This effect decreases as well over the ten periods, but remains large and significant. 
 
It is possible that the fact that “lagged increasing” types contribute significantly more is the 
result of a wealth effect coming from their higher average profits from the preceding stage.  Under the 
assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion, this greater wealth could produce a greater 
willingness to contribute.  While possible, we do believe that any income effect would be small, 
certainly not enough to generate the observed discrepancy.  On the contrary, we consider these 
findings to be strongly suggestive evidence that threshold type can induce long-run cooperative 
behavior, most likely through a history of successful cooperation and an increased level of trust. 
 
Table 6: Contribution and Profit vs. Lagged Group Type 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
The findings in this paper are important because they tell us that thresholds can serve as 
powerful reference points for contributions.  In general, the increasing threshold game produced more 
contributions and higher profits than the decreasing threshold game.  The largest differences occurred 
in the middle range of thresholds and in the first stage. Despite the fact that contributions were similar 
for the increasing and decreasing threshold group types when thresholds were low, a sizeable gap 
opened up around the average threshold size.  This finding is entirely consistent with our initial 
hypothesis: the successful cooperation of the early stages in the increasing group produces higher 
contributions than the failed cooperation of the early stages of the decreasing threshold group type. In 
the middle range of thresholds, from 50 to 70, the increasing threshold group types are much more 
likely to attain the public good than their decreasing threshold group type counterparts. The gap 
between increasing and decreasing threshold group types also held for profits.  All of these findings 
demonstrate that for nearly ever threshold, it was more profitable to be in an increasing than in a 
decreasing threshold group type. 
 
Profits in the increasing game at thresholds of 50 and 60 are identical to the constant game, 
suggesting that at least by those periods, little trust has been gained or lost as compared to a constant 
game.  However, the decreasing threshold groups game’s profits are considerably lower at those levels, 
suggesting a greater coordination failure than in the other two games.  These findings call for a more 
in-depth study to determine whether the dominance of increasing over decreasing thresholds holds up 
with a larger sample size. 
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 Appendix A: Experimental Instructions 
 
Figure A1: Introduction Screen 
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Figure A2: Instruction Screens 1-4 
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Figure A3: Stage Introduction Screen: Here the players learn how the thresholds will be varying over the course of 
the following 10 periods. 
 
 
Figure A4: Contribution Screen: Here the players decide how much of their 25 points they contribute to the 
common pot. 
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Figure A5: Period Outcome Screen: Here the players learn whether or not the threshold was reached for this 
period.  Note that in order to avoid salience of income effects, the players do not learn exactly how much money they 
made from that stage. 
 
Figure A6: Stage Completion Screen: Players are told that the stage is finished, and how much money they have 
made in total. 
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Figure A7: Game Completion Screen 
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Appendix B: Voluntary Surveys 
 
Figure B1: Risk Aversion Question 
Your code___ ______
 
 
 
 
In the table below, you are presented with a choice between two lotteries, A or B, along with the payoff 
matrix for each lottery.  
 
For example, the first row shows that lottery A offers a 10% chance of receiving $2 and a 90% chance of 
receiving $1.60. Similarly, lottery B offers a 10% chance of receiving $3.85 and a 90% chance of $0.10. 
 
In the third table column, simply indicate given the two lotteries in each row, which one would you prefer if 
you are given the choice? A or B for each row? 
 
 
 
 
 
prob($2) prob($1.6) prob($3.85) prob($0.10)
0.1 $2.00 0.9 $1.60 0.1 $3.85 0.9 $0.10
0.2 $2.00 0.8 $1.60 0.2 $3.85 0.8 $0.10
0.3 $2.00 0.7 $1.60 0.3 $3.85 0.7 $0.10
0.4 $2.00 0.6 $1.60 0.4 $3.85 0.6 $0.10
0.5 $2.00 0.5 $1.60 0.5 $3.85 0.5 $0.10
0.6 $2.00 0.4 $1.60 0.6 $3.85 0.4 $0.10
0.7 $2.00 0.3 $1.60 0.7 $3.85 0.3 $0.10
0.8 $2.00 0.2 $1.60 0.8 $3.85 0.2 $0.10
0.9 $2.00 0.1 $1.60 0.9 $3.85 0.1 $0.10
1 $2.00 0 $1.60 1 $3.85 0 $0.10
Loterry A Loterry B Your lottery choice
 
 30
 
Figure B2: Socioeconomic Survey 
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